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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Marco Rios-Lopez appeals following the district court’s order denying his motion
for credit for time served. Mr. Rios-Lopez asserts that the district court erred in denying
him credit for pre-judgment incarceration on five additional counts where the district
court erroneously found the holding in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 6 (2015) (holding
I.C. § 18-309 requires courts to credit a defendant with prejudgment incarceration
served on each count), was inapplicable to Mr. Rios-Lopez’s case because his case
was on collateral review. This was error as Mr. Rios-Lopez’s motion for credit for time
served did not call for collateral review or retroactive application. Although the Owens
Court noted that its holding would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review, Mr. Rios-Lopez’s motion for credit was made through I.C.R. 35(c), which
provides that such a motion can be made at any time. In that way an I.C.R. 35(c)
motion is more ministerial, as it corrects a mathematical error in the judgment of
conviction. Where Mr. Rios-Lopez’s appeal of the district court’s denial of the motion for
credit was timely from the district court’s order, the issue comes before this Court on
direct review, and the district court’s denial was error.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2001, Marco Rios-Lopez was convicted of three counts of trafficking and three
counts of failure to affix illegal drug tax stamps for selling cocaine to a confidential
informant. (R., pp.561-566.) On each of the three trafficking charges, the district court
imposed a sentence of fourteen years, with seven years fixed. (R., pp.707-712.) On
each of the failure to affix tax stamp charges, the district court imposed a sentence of
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two years, with one year fixed.

(R., pp.707-712.)

The district court ordered the

sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate unified sentence of forty-eight
years, with twenty-four years fixed. (R., pp.708-711.) The district court gave Mr. RiosLopez 253 days of credit for time served for the first count of trafficking. (R., p.708.)
In 2016, Mr. Rios-Lopez filed a pro se Motion for ICR 35(a)(c) Correction of
Illegal Sentence and a supporting affidavit. (R., pp.842-845.) Mr. Rios-Lopez, relying
on Idaho Code § 18-309 and State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015), asked for credit for
the time he spent in custody prior to his sentencing where he was held on all counts for
253 days but only credited with 253 days on Count I. (R., pp.842-843.) Mr. Rios-Lopez
asserted he was therefore entitled to 253 days credit on each of the remaining 7 counts
for an additional 1,771 days total.1 (R., pp.842-843.) He requested the 1,771 days
asserting he was, pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Owens, entitled to
credit for pre-judgment incarceration on all counts, even if the sentences were ordered
to be consecutive. (R., pp.842-843.) The district court denied the motion without a
hearing, holding that the Owens decision was not retroactive and that Mr. Rios-Lopez’s
attack on the judgment was collateral, rather than direct. (R., pp.851-854.) The court
held that “[b]ecause his case was not on direct review in 2015 when Owens was
decided, his Motion must fail.” (R., p.853.)
Mr. Rios-Lopez filed a pro se Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s
order. (R., pp.855-858.)

Mr. Rios-Lopez was sentenced to consecutive sentences on six counts (R., p.707), it
is not clear why he is under the impression that he was convicted of eight counts
(R., p.843).

1
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rios-Lopez’s motion for credit for time
served?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Rios-Lopez’s Motion For Credit For Time
Served
A.

Introduction
Mr. Rios-Lopez asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for

credit for time served. Mr. Rios-Lopez is entitled to credit for pre-judgment incarceration
on all six of his sentences. Mr. Rios-Lopez asserts that, because the facts in the record
clearly establish he is owed an additional 253 days of credit for each of the five charges
for which he was incarcerated prior to his conviction, the district court erred in denying
his motion for credit for time served. He respectfully requests that this Court order that
he be given credit for time served in the amount of 1,265 days, 253 days on each of the
five cases on which he received no credit.
B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id.
C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Rios-Lopez’s Motion For Credit For Time
Served
The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion

to correct the calculation of credit at any time; thus, the time the judgment is entered or
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executed is not a factor to be considered in performing a credit calculation. I.C.R. 35(c).
Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has made clear, “the language of I.C. § 18-309 is
mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this case)
when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court give the
appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014). “This
means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as defined
by the statute. Id.
Idaho Code Section 18–309 governs when credit must be given for both pre- and
post-judgment incarceration:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The
remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of sentence
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned
thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as
part of such term.
(Emphasis added.) The language of I.C. § 18–309 entitles a defendant to credit for “any
period of incarceration” and, notably, does not base credit on any factor other than
actual incarceration “for the offense or an included offense.”

The Idaho Court of

Appeals has explained, “[t]he directive of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory, specifying that a
person shall receive credit.” State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 (1983)) (emphasis in original).
In State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
plain language of Idaho Code section 18-309 requires the court to credit a defendant
“for time served on each of his offenses, whether to be served concurrently or
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consecutively.” Id. at 4. In Owens, five months after the judgment of conviction was
entered, Mr. Owens filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c) seeking credit for time
served for all of the charges for which he was incarcerated prior to the entry of
judgment.2 Id. at 2-3. He asserted that he was statutorily entitled to the credit on each
of his consecutive counts and that the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hoch,
102 Idaho 351 (1981), was manifestly wrong and should be overruled. Id. at 3. After
the district court denied the motion, Mr. Owens timely appealed. Id. The Owens Court
granted relief on direct appeal from the denial of the Rule 35(c) motion for credit for time
served. The Owens Court agreed with Mr. Owens, finding that the statutory language
was unambiguous and its decision in Hoch was manifestly wrong, overruling that
decision “to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law.” Owens, 158 Idaho at 6. The
Owens Court found that courts had been erroneously interpreting I.C. § 18-309 since
1981, but it corrected the previous error by overruling wrongly decided precedent and
awarding the proper credit to Mr. Owens. Id. at 3-5.
The Court granted Mr. Owens the relief he sought, but included a section in the
opinion which cautioned that this new interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 would not be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

Id. at 6-7.

The Owens Court

analyzed the retroactivity of its decision using Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), for
criminal cases on collateral review. Owens, 158 Idaho at 6.
The Court found:
The threshold question in applying the Teague test is whether a case
announces a new rule. See State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 505
To the extent the Court’s opinion in Owens may not contain a clear reference to the
criminal rule pursuant to which Mr. Owens sought relief, Mr. Rios-Lopez asks this Court
to take judicial notice of the record and appellate briefing in Owens.
2
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(Wyo.2014). Generally a case announces a new rule “when it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation” on states. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301,
109 S.Ct. at 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d at 349. In other words, “a case announces
a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final.” Id. (emphasis in original). We
have never before interpreted Idaho Code section 18–309 as adding credit
for time served to each consecutive count in a judgment. Because we are
now interpreting section 18–309 in a way that was not dictated by
precedent, this case announces a new rule.
Id.

The Owens Court held that it would apply its new interpretation of the plain

language of I.C. § 18-309 “only prospectively and to cases now on direct review.” Id. at
7.
To deny all of the defendants the credit to which the Idaho Legislature has
deemed they are legally entitled to is wrong, particularly in light of the fact that Owens
was just such a case. In Owens, five months after the judgment of conviction was
entered, Mr. Owens filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c) seeking credit for time
served for all of the charges for which he was incarcerated prior to the entry of
judgment. While the Owens Court saw fit to correct Mr. Owens’ case, it prohibited
retroactive application of the new rule to cases on collateral review, but did not address
the fact that cases could potentially come before it on direct review and in exactly the
same procedural posture as Mr. Owens’ case—those on appeal from the denial of a
I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served. Notably, the Owens Court never classified
Mr. Owens’ case as being before it on collateral review; instead, the Court’s concern
was with making sure the problematic precedent was overruled and that the affected
defendants received the credit which the Legislature had deemed them entitled to.
Refusing to apply the plain language of a statute to Mr. Rios-Lopez’s case simply
because his case was not on direct review at the time of the Court’s decision in Owens
would be manifestly unfair. The Idaho Legislature has determined that consecutively
7

sentenced defendants such as Mr. Rios-Lopez are entitled to credit for time served on
all counts. Further, such an application would unnecessarily punish Mr. Rios-Lopez by
treating him differently from those defendants who had the good fortune of being
similarly sentenced after the Owens decision was rendered.
A defendant’s appeal from the denial of a motion for credit for time served is not
a case on “collateral review.” Like the defendant in Owens, Mr. Rios-Lopez timely
appealed from the denial of his motion for credit for time served. In denying Mr. RiosLopez’s motion, the district court noted that in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 7 (2015),
the Idaho Supreme Court “held that I.C. § 18-309 would not be applied retroactively, ‘we
apply this Court’s new interpretation of Idaho Code section 18-309’s plain language only
prospectively and to cases now on direct review.’” (R., p.852.) The district court also
noted that Mr. Rios-Lopez’s attack on the judgment is collateral, not direct where “[a]
collateral attack is ‘a defendant’s action against the state seeking post-conviction relief
from all or part of the judgment rendered against him.’” (R., p.853.) The district court
concluded that because Mr. Rios-Lopez’s case was not on direct review when Owens
was decided, “his Motion must fail.” (R., p.853.)
While the Owens Court did say that its holding will not be applied retroactively to
cases on collateral review, I.C.R. 35(c) provides that a motion may be filed “at any
time”, thus, the credited time may be directly raised to the district court at any time. A
direct appeal from a denial of motion for credit for time served is not a case on
“collateral review,” thus the district court erred in using a retroactivity analysis.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines “collateral” as follows:
1. Supplementary; accompanying, but secondary and subordinate to
“whether the accident victim was wearing a seat belt is a collateral issue.”
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2. Not direct in line, but on a parallel or diverging line of descent; of,
relating to, or involving a person who is related by blood but is neither an
ancestor nor a descendant “an uncle is in a collateral, not a direct, line.”
COLLATERAL, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously defined “collateral” to mean postconviction, or habeas proceedings. See Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 419 (1991)
(explaining the difference between whether a new rule of law will apply either to “to a
convicted defendant whose status is yet pending on direct appeal, or, to equally extend
that new rule to a defendant whose case is closed as to the direct appeal, but is yet
subject to collateral appeal, i.e., a defendant’s action against the state seeking postconviction relief from all or part of the judgment rendered against him.”); see also Ex
parte Olsen, 74 Idaho 400, 403 (1953) (comparing the function of a writ of habeas
corpus “as a means of collateral attack upon a judgment or process which is absolutely
void,” to the function of “proceeding for the review of errors committed by a trial court
within its jurisdiction.”); but c.f. O’Neill v. Potvin, 13 Idaho 721, ___, 93 P. 20, 21 (1907)
(defining “collateral attack” in an action to quiet a title whereby “the attack upon a
judgment is collateral if the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and
contemplates some other relief or result than the mere setting aside of the judgment,
although the setting aside of the judgment may be necessary to secure such
independent purpose.”). However, the O’Neill Court’s explanation of a “collateral attack”
does not encompass a credit for time served motion because it is just another motion in
the same, ongoing case and is not an “action or proceeding” with an “independent
purpose.” 13 Idaho at 21.
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Thus, an appeal from an order denying a motion for credit for time served is one
of direct review, as the credit for time served is never a final determination where the
rule allows for adjustment at any time.

Ultimately, the district court never loses

jurisdiction to correct the amount of credit for time served that the defendant is owed
because the award of credit is mandatory. See State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21
(Ct. App. 2014). This makes sense because a motion for credit for time served is not a
collateral attack on a conviction, and is, essentially, handled as a ministerial matter—a
continuation of the case by means of correction of a previous mistake—and not as a
decision which would necessarily impact the finality of the conviction. In that way an
I.C.R. 35(c) motion is more ministerial, as it corrects a mathematical error in the
judgment of conviction.
Here, Mr. Rios-Lopez’s motion for credit for time served was filed on March 4,
2016, and, at the time the district court denied the credit motion, the district court had
jurisdiction. Now, on direct appeal of the district court’s denial of the motion for credit
for time served, the issue of whether the district court properly credited Mr. Rios-Lopez
will be directly reviewed. The Owens decision applies to the facts of Mr. Rios-Lopez’s
case and he is entitled to credit for time served on all six counts.
Further, in situations where the defendant is sentenced to the statutory maximum
but did not receive credit for time they were incarcerated pre-judgment, and who served
the entire sentence without parole, the sentence would be illegal because they will
serve more than the statutory maximum. I.C.R. 35(a); State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho
895 (Ct. App. 1991). Such a situation was recently recognized by the Idaho Court of
Appeals. State v. Martin, 159 Idaho 860, 367 P.3d 255, 259 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding
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that the Owens Court decided the underlying illegality argument in the defendant's
“motion for credit for time served,” thus the Court in Owens effectively treated the
defendant's motion as one made pursuant to Rule 35(a).)
Here, Mr. Rios-Lopez is entitled to credit for all of the time he was incarcerated.
Where Mr. Rios-Lopez was incarcerated for 253 days on each of the six counts prior to
being sentenced, he is owed an additional 1,265 days of credit for time served; thus, the
district court erred in denying his motion for credit for time served.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Rios-Lopez respectfully requests that this
Court order that he be given additional credit for time served in the amount of 1,265
days.
DATED this 15th day of November, 2016.
_________/s/________________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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